Simon

Democratic Regime Types and the International Risk-taking of Democracies: Comparing the United States and Great Britain

By Eszter Simon

Thesis submitted as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Department of Political Science, Central European University

Supervisor Tamás Meszerics, Central European University

PhD Committee András Bozóki (Chair), Professor, Central European University Paul Roe, Associate Professor, Central European University A. Cooper Drury, Associate Professor, University of Missouri-Columbia

Budapest, Hungary 2008

Abstract

It is almost a commonplace to claim today that democracies, at least, vis-à-vis each other, are more peaceful than autocracies. But are all democracies equally peaceful? This dissertation contends that parliamentary and presidential systems do differ in their international risktaking propensity and offers a new institutionalist explanation for why it is so. The explanation is based on two assertions: the first is that the differences in the logic of accountability between the two democratic regime types determine how they behave at the international scene. After throwing light on the lack of attention paid to the actual constellation of political forces in the characterization of regime types in comparative politics, accountability of the executive is conceptualized along two dimensions: the separation of powers, that is, static dimensions of democratic institutions (term of office, executivelegislative relations, authority of the chief executive in the cabinet); and the separation of purpose, which is an approximation of actual political circumstances. The second point of departure in the explanation is that the relationship between accountability and international risking-taking (operationalized as war fighting) is non-linear. While both the democratic peace and diversionary theory literatures have previously linked accountability to risk-taking behavior, their claims...