Reading Review

There were 2 groups involved the assessment of the damage to the orbiter. One was NASA, contractor engineers and photo lab engineers. Including Debris Assessment Team, Department of Defense, and In tercenter Photo Working Group. They felt anxious about the potential damage from this foam strike. And the other group was the senior managers. Such as Linda Ham, She was the Chair of the Mission Management Team. And Ron Dittemore,He was the Space Shuttle Program Manager. This group believed that the foam strike was no serious risk to the orbiter. These two groups worked closely together and saw the same evidence, but perceived risk associated with the foam strike in distinctly opposite ways.

There was a discussion during the Columbia mission.

Shuttle Program managers and assessment engineers had different opinions on the potential damage of foam strike early in the mission and continued to diverge as the mission progressed. Because of Mission Managers' low concern and desire to get on with the mission. Debris assessment team had to prove there was a safety-in-flight issue before the Shuttle Program Management would move to take pictures of the left wing. The engineers found themselves in the unusual position. They had to prove the situation was not safe. However, the usual requirement was to prove that a situation was safe.

At the same time, engineers calculated the potential size of the debris, its speed, and assessed potential damage to the left wing by using a mathematical model known as Crater. The Crater model was considered as a conservative tool because it predicted more damage than actually happened in previous tests. And the result of the Crater modeling would be presented to Mission Management Team. So the engineers remained intent on acquiring photos of the left wing. They requested both formally and informally. But at that time, Budget cuts resulted in lack of resources, personnel, independence and authority. Congress always gave NASA less...