Introduction

Introduction

In Scenario two, Jeremy was under the age of majority. He signed a contract for lease. The dealer assumed Jeremy was of the age of majority. Later Jeremy disaffirmed the contract under the protection of the infancy doctrine. In scenario three, Brian stated he plans two years later to offer his train set for sale only to Harry. Harry stated he is looking forward to buy the train set. Two years later Brian sold the train to another person. Harry would naturally pursue a cause of action on the grounds of promissory estoppels, but he would lose.

Scenario two

Similarly to the case Kiefer, v. Fred Howe Motors (1968), the rule of law in scenario two is the infancy doctrine, which states that “a contract with a minor, other than for necessities, is voidable at the minor's option. It is irrelevant to the law whether the other party knows that she is contracting with a minor” (Supreme Court of Wisconsin, 1968). Jeremy did not have a contractual capacity, therefore the contract is unenforceable. In addition, the car dealer must return all payments made to Jeremy.

The car dealer may have a defense only if he can prove buying a car was part of Jeremy’s necessaries of life. “Goods and services such as automobiles, tools of trade, education, and vocation training have also been found to be necessaries of life in some situations” (Cheeseman, 2009).

A good example of Wisconsin Supreme Court’s reasoning on a similar situation is the case Kiefer v. Fred Howe Motors, Inc., 158 NW 2d 288 (1968). Kiefer purchased an automobile from Fred Howe Motors and later disaffirmed the contract. The Supreme Court reasoned that even if a minor is married, or emancipated, that does not mean he has the maturity or wisdom of an adult. The Supreme Court ruled that the contract stay disaffirmed.

Conclusion:

In scenario two, if the car was part of Jeremy’s necessaries of life, the lease contract is enforceable. In the case Kiefer v. Fred Howe Motors one judge, Judge Hollows,...