Externalism the Ordinary Knowledge Ascription Argument

The way in which we attain knowledge from the world is a subject extensively debated between epistemic philosophers. It can be broken down into two main categories of beliefs about how we do reach knowledge, one being internalism which is defined by Pappas as “ a thesis about the basis of either knowledge or justified belief… [it] holds that a person either does or can have a form of access to the basis for knowledge or justified belief. The key idea is that the person either is or can be aware of this basis.” (Pappas) in contrast he states that externalists “deny that one always can have this sort of access to the basis for one's knowledge and justified belief” (Pappas). Two main arguments focused on internalism and externalism can be used to examine the validity and strength of each, the truth connection argument and the ordinary knowledge ascription argument. These arguments raise many questions; firstly is truth connected to epistemic justification. This is closely followed by questions concerning unsophisticated beings; such as children and animals, do they have knowledge? If we accept that they do have knowledge can they justify it, or does knowledge even need any form of justification for it to be accepted as true? And finally if some form of justification in required must it be complete justification? Exploration into these questions that begin the debate on whether epistemic internalism or externalism is the correct way in thinking will be explored through a series of connected arguments and premises that explain why externalism is the stronger belief to hold.

The truth connection argument is a strong argument for the externalist: it states that for something to have epistemic justification it must also have truth. The basis of the argument lies on the claim that epistemic justification is different from moral or prudential justifications. A prudential justification is exemplified as follows “one can be prudentially justified in believing that one’s...