Information Manipulation and Reform in Authoritarian Regimes

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Political Science Department

Research Paper No. 2014-21

Information Manipulation and Reform in Authoritarian Regimes

Jidong Chen, Princeton University

Yiqing Xu, MIT

Information Manipulation and Reform

in Authoritarian Regimes∗

Jidong Chen†

Yiqing Xu‡

(Forthcoming in Political Science Research and Methods)

Submitted: 09/28/2014

Accepted: 05/15/2015

Abstract

We develop a theory of how an authoritarian regime interactively uses information manipulation, such as propaganda or censorship, and policy improvement to maintain social stability. The government can depict the status

quo policy more popularly supported than it actually is, while at the same

time please citizens directly by enacting a costly reform. We show that the

government’s ability of making policy concessions reduces its incentive to

manipulate information and improves its credibility. Anticipating a higher

chance of policy concessions and less information manipulation, citizens are

more likely to believe the government-provided information and support the

regime. Our model provides an explanation for the puzzling fact that reform

coexists with selective information disclosure in authoritarian countries like

China.

Keywords: propaganda, censorship, information disclosure, reform, authoritarian governance, institutional design, responsiveness

∗

The authors are indebted to Jonathan Hanson, Mehdi Shadmehr and two anonymous referees

for their helpful comments and suggestions.

†

Assistant Professor, Beijing Normal University Business School; Wallis Institute of Political

Economy, University of Rochester. Email: jidongc@princeton.edu.

‡

PhD Candidate, Department of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Email: xyq@mit.edu.

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Introduction

How does an authoritarian government like China’s govern its people and manage

to stay in power? Providing better policies (through reform) and manipulating

information citizens receive (through propaganda...