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The British Society for the Philosophy of Science

Proofs and Refutations (II)

Author(s): I. Lakatos

Source: The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 14, No. 54 (Aug., 1963), pp.


Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of The British Society for the

Philosophy of Science

Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/685430

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(c) Improving the conjecture by exception-barring methods. Piecemeal

exclusions. Strategic withdrawal or playing for safety

BETA: I suppose, sir, you are going to explain your puzzling

remarks. But, with all apologies for my impatience, I must get this

off my chest.


(ALPHA re-enters.)

BETA: I find some aspects of Delta's arguments silly, but I have

come to believe that there is a reasonable kernel to them. It now

seems to me that no conjecture is generally valid, but only valid in a

certain restricted domain that excludes the exceptions. I am against

dubbing these exceptions 'monsters' or 'pathological cases'. That

would amount to the methodological decision not to consider these as

interesting examples in their...