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KANTIAN CONSTRUCTIVISM AS NORMATIVE ETHICS

“[W]e cannot learn philosophy; for where is it, who is in possession of it, and how shall we recognize it? We can only learn to philosophize, that is, to exercise the talent of reason, in accordance with its universal principles, on certain actually existing attempts at philosophy, always, however, reserving the right of reason to investigate, to confirm, or to reject these principles in their very sources.” (Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B 866)

“So we learn moral and political philosophy, and indeed any other part of philosophy by studying the exemplars—those noted figures who have made cherished attempts—and we try to learn from them, and if we are lucky to find a way to go beyond them.” (John Rawls, Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy, xiv).

Prologue

These passages reveal the attitude that Kant and Rawls had towards their exemplars in the history of philosophy. The attitude is deeply respectful but also modestly ambitious about the prospects of “going beyond” their work in ways appropriate for one’s own projects and times. Kant and Rawls are both philosophical exemplars for me, regardless of ways in which they may disagree with each other and I with them. For many years I have thought, and occasionally proposed, that a promising kind of normative ethical theory can be drawn from Kant and Rawls by combining some of their ideas in a way appropriate for a somewhat different project. With some hesitation, I call this Kantian Constructivism as a normative ethical theory. This is not the “Kantian constructivism” as interpreted by Onora O’Neill, Christine Korsgaard, or John Rawls. Their proposals are comprehensive[i] moral theories that include metaethical claims drawn primarily from Kant’s Universal Law Formulation of the Categorical Imperative. My proposal, instead, has been to think of Kantian constructivism as a normative ethical theory that relies heavily on...