Fencing

Cromwell, Paul and James N. Olson. 2010. “Fencing: Avenues for Redistribution of Stolen Property.” Pp. 265-282 in In Their Own Words, edited by Paul Cromwell. New York: Oxford University Press.

Summary: The individuals or groups involved in the burglar/fence relationship differ among each transaction, yet they share common ground at the end of the sale by creating an underground market. From seasoned professionals to untrustworthy drug addicts, criminals supply stolen goods to purchasers ranging from unsuspecting housewives to profiting professional fences. Whichever category of burglar/fence an individual or group falls into, the outcome is more or less the same. The burglars are compensated with cash or sometimes drugs, and the stolen goods that are acquired by the fences are resold for a profit or kept for personal use. “If burglary is the supply side of the stolen property, then fencing is the demand side.” Cromwell and Olson suggest that without the demand, or access thereto, the supplier would indeed be limited or out of business entirely.

Critique: The fence perpetuates the act of burglary as demand instigates a flood of suppliers. A similar economic trend but separate criminal issue is that of prostitution. I am currently reading a book, Half the Sky by Nicholas D. Kristof and Sheryl WuDunn, 2010, that discusses the “big-stick” approach taken by Sweden in 1999 in order to decrease the amount of prostitution and make Sweden a less enticing destination to sex traffickers. Swedish authorities targeted and criminalized the “Johns” while the prostitutes were not prosecuted. This “big-stick” approach diminished the demand, which in turn dwindled the supply. In addition, sex trafficking became less profitable in Sweden. I do not condone weaker punishment for thieves, but if the punishment were more severe for the purchasing of stolen items, the demand would dry up and the decline of supply would naturally follow.