Risk

Unstaffing risk

The TAPS previously installed varies systems to detect the hazards, such as fire system and flooding agents, but all of these are required staff operating. After the reconfiguration, SCADA systems will be used in the OCC in Anchorage to provide technical support in remote control, which allows the pump stations to achieve unstaffing. Although electrification and automation can reduce the demand for staffs in stations, on the other hand, it will increase the risk for unlikely detection and suppression of fire, especially for PS 1, which is responsible for receives oil from the producers. Since it reserves larger portions of oil than others, it is more susceptible to fire.

In order to reduce the risk, new detect and suppression equipment need to be reconfigured to be able to access fully remote control. Also, telecommunication equipment needs to be ungraded. For the TAPS staffs, a training program is needed to provide properly training, being sure that they are qualified to perform in a new working condition.

If fire or leak still occurs under this condition, the SCADA system is designed to automatically shut down and fuel sources will be isolated. Retained facilities will be upgraded to meet appropriate code requirements.

Pipeline Operational risk

The capacity of TAPS is designed for more than 2 million barrels of oil through pipeline per day, and in 2001, transporting of oil is about 1 million barrels per day. If in order to work for the reconfiguration and to shut down the entire pipelines, the loss involved is unpredictable. Thus, pump in these stations are still needed to operate daily to make sure the entire pipeline is transporting.

Therefore, to prevent this risk, Alyeska will keep one or two of pumps in station in normally operation, leaving one in reserve. Even though there will be unstaffing after the reconfiguration complete, during the reconfiguration, there still need staffs to make sure TAPS’s daily operation.

If the pumps...