Identity Theory

Identity Theory

Identity theory proposes the idea that the mind and the brain are not separate entities, but are indiscerptible from one another. Whereas dualism asserts that the mind and the brain, or body, are separate concepts capable of communicating, identity theory posits that the mind and the brain are the same concept with two names. I believe identity theory holds true under observation because of the inseparable links between mental processes such as thoughts, memories, and perceptions and physiological brain processes such as electrical currents running between neurons.

J.J.C. Smart, an Australian philosopher, advocates identity theory and describes the difference between the definitions of the mind and the brain to be that “a sensation statement is a report of… a brain process” (Smart in Solomon, 350). Smart discerns that statements about the mind, such as sensations, are a collection of brain processes that are interpreted into the concept of a sensation. This supports identity theory because it accounts for definitions of mental states, such as memories, varying from the physiological process that occurs in the brain. By describing sensations as “a report of something” (Smart in Solomon, 350) in the brain, Smart defines mental processes as a functional form of a collection of physiological processes. This definition of mental processes provides a successful counterargument for a common critique of identity theory.

A critique commonly used when questioning the validity of identity theory relates to the specific location of some mental processes such as thoughts and memories. Jerome Shaffer uses thoughts as an example to question the connection between mental and physical processes. Shaffer ruminates on the location of mental processes such as thoughts, and concludes, “all we could ever observe in the brain would be the physical events which occur in it” (Shaffer in Solomon, 354). Shaffer believes that if there were a location in the brain where...