An Economic Analysis of Spanish Inquisition’s Motivations

The motivations behind the Spanish Inquisition (1478-1834) have long intrigued historians.

This paper explores the role of the Spanish Inquisition as a repressive tool of

the Spanish Crown and provides evidence of the long-term effects of this institution. In

particular, I explore the relationship between inquisitorial activity and war from both

a theoretical and an empirical point of view. Governmentâs demand for social control/

repression was greater in periods of war, because war increased the likelihood of

internal revolts. To minimize the threat of rebellion, the Inquisition conducted more

trials when Spanish war activity was intense. However, once the benefits of the activity

needed to satisfy the demand for social control exceeded its costs, the Inquisition

dropped its repression level. This behavior describes an inverse-U relationship between

inquisitorial and war intensity. To test the predictions of this framework, I assemble

time series data for seven Spanish inquisitorial districts on annual trials of the Inquisition

as well as wars conducted by the Spanish Crown. I show that there exists an

inverse-U relationship between wars and inquisitorial activity. My results are robust

to the inclusion of data on the severity of the weather (droughts) in the regression as

well as adjustments for spillover effects from other districts than the main district under

analysis. I also construct a database of 35,000 trials of the Inquisition to study

if the Inquisition also persecuted citizens for other reasons. My results show that religious

persecution was especially significant at early stages of inquisitorial existence,

while repressive motivations explain better the behavior of this institution later on.

With respect to the consequences of the Spanish Inquisition, I construct a dataset for

five regions and fourteen provinces on inquisitorial activity, population, economic and

political outcomes, I show that regions that were more affected by...