Aid to Pakistan

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Aid to Pakistan |

For Dana Rohrabacher |

Chairman Oversight Subcommittee House Foreign Affairs Committee |

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Brian Spicer

PUBP 700-Rozell

10-17-11

The Problem

Since 1954, the United States has provided aid to Pakistan at a rate consistent with quotas given to other allies in the world. The intent of this aid, both economic and military, was to help foster a positive relationship with a neighbor in South Asia, to recruit an ally during the cold war, and to maintain a balance of power between Pakistan and India. Following the events of 9/11 and the subsequent invasion of Afghanistan, the amount of aid would change radically from 7.7 million (in 1994) to over $4 billion (in 2010). (Provost, 2011) This increase, deemed necessary to assist the US militarily in Afghanistan, strengthened not only Pakistan’s ability to hunt down Taliban and Al-Qaeda agents, but also to stabilize its own government owing to internal struggles and its unpopular alliance with the US. Pakistan relies on this aid from the US to keep its government stable. A weak economy due to the extremism within the country, and recurrent natural disasters that the country has had to face over the past few years, highlight this need. (Melik, 2011) However, rather than help the US achieve its goals in this region, Pakistan used most of this money to build up its military strength against India, an archenemy of Pakistan. Thus with only $500 million, (of the $6.6 billion it received), going to its efforts to contain the Haqqani network and other extremists into Afghanistan, the US government needs to address this anomaly. (Gannon, 2009)

Besides this misappropriation of US aid dollars is the lack of help coming from the Pakistani Intelligence Agency (ISI). The ISI did little to find and remove Bin Laden from within its borders and its connections with the Haqqani network, which has launched attacks against and killed American soldiers in Afghanistan, are also well...