An Operations Analysis of the Big Dig

An Operations Analysis of The Big Dig

Over eighty years ago, Boston’s city planners identified a need for their street systems to be adapted to the requirements of the motor age. At the time, an elevated expressway was recommended. It was acknowledged by the early planners that the erection of the elevated structures would hurt some Bostonian’s quality of life. The project was stalled for many years, partly due to events beyond Boston’s control. The Great Depression along with World War II were just two factors that delayed this project.

The project kicked off in 1953 when Boston built the Central Artery. It was built along Boston’s waterfront due to the location of the business district being centered around shipping. The artery displaced over 550 businesses and hundreds of families. The interstate opened in 1959 and was able to accommodate 75,000 vehicles per day. As the use of this highway quickly exploded, the number of vehicles that used it per day quickly grew to over 200,000. As a result, the Central Artery quickly became obsolete. The sheer volume of traffic subjected the interstate to traffic jams nearly 10 hours per weekday. Experts estimated the cost per year in burnt fuel idling in this traffic at a staggering $500 million. It quickly became apparent that the Central Artery was not the answer that Boston was looking for. Just about a decade after the artery opened, Boston lawmakers began to concoct a way to destroy it. Thus, the concept for a vehicular subway was born, and from it, the Big Dig.

The Big Dig was arguably the most technically challenging highway infrastructure development to ever take place in the United States. It was designed to accommodate 245,000 vehicles per day. It was composed of seven and a half miles of highway, more than half of which were in tunnels. The project included the construction of six interchanges and 200 bridges. The sheer scope of the Big Dig was magnificent. It was quite remarkable (problems...