Bioethical

Some Practical Considerations of the Concept of “Self” or Personal Identity, understood as “Person” or “Personhood”

Philosophy, through continuing to grapple with the problem of “Personal Identity,” contributes to exploring vital questions for medical professionals and hospitals about how to act ethically toward their patients in practical situations, especially in end-of-life situations.

One question that is not easy to answer is: Who should we consider “a person”? What conditions should be met before we call a given patient or “being” a “person”?

According to the biomedical ethicist David Perry,[1] “[T]o be classified as a ‘person’ normally entails having strong moral rights and legal protections, and higher moral status than living things that cannot credibly be classified as persons.” He points out that we need to find “the necessary and sufficient conditions for knowing when a particular kind of being exists or does not exist.”

This knowledge would have some contribution to make to the debate about whether or not a fetus is a person, for example. But it also would be key to determining whether or not a given patient at the end of life exists as a “person” or not. Perry goes on to describe five “traits” that have been associated philosophically with the concept of a “person”: (1) consciousness, “and in particular the capacity to feel pain”; (2) reasoning ; (3) self-motivated activity; (4) ability to communicate in some way; (5) some capacity for self-awareness.

Perry does not think that all of these conditions should necessarily hold all the time in order for us to distinguish a person from a non-person. But he does point out that many people might agree that “reasoning” can be seen as both a necessary and sufficient condition for being considered a “person.”

But if that is true, “then some patients, such as the severely retarded or demented, may not qualify as persons, and we are in danger of logically excluding “many vulnerable human...